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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRED SULLIVAN, 
Cross-Complainant and Respondent 
vs 
HARVEY STONE, S & I TRUCKING CO., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE! APPEAL 
On April 20, 1957, at about 10 :30 P.M. on Highway 
30 \vest of Castle Rock, Utah, a truck driven by Lloyd 
V. Higginbotham crashed into the rear of a parked 
truck owned by S & I Trucking Company and driven by 
Harvey Stone. A few moments later, a car driven by 
John Schweitzer coining the other direction crashed 
into both trucks. 
Florence Schweitzer, passenger in the automobile, 
filed suit for injuries received against Harvey Stone, 
S & I Trucking Company, Lloyd V. Higginbotham, West-
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ern Auto Transport Company (employer -of Lloyd V. 
Higginbotham) and Fred Sullivan (owner of the second 
truck). Ivan Sheffy, a Hecond employee of S & I Truck-
ing Company, intervened in the suit seeking damages 
against Lloyd V. Higginbotham, Western Auto Trans-
port Company and Fred Sullivan. Harve)'·Stone and S & 
I Trucking Con1pany cross claimed against Lloyd V. 
Higginbotham, Fred Sullivan and Western Auto Trans-
port Company and Lloyd V. Higginbotha1n, Fred Sul-
livan and W·estern Auto Transport Company cross 
claimed against Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Com-
pany. 
On the trial of the case, Western Auto Transport 
Company, Fred Sullivan and Lloyd V. Higginbotham 
settled with Florence Schweitzer for $10,000.00. The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Florence Schweitzer 
and against all defendants except Fred Sullivan in the 
amount of $23,000.00. A judgment of $13,000.00 was 
entered against Harvey Stone and S & l Trucking Com-
pany, who appealed to this Court from the judgment. 
This appeal was dis1nisS'ed prior to argument by stipu-
lation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ivan 
Sheffy and against Lloyd V. Higginbotham and Western 
Auto Transport Company in the sum of $4,500.00, an 
appeal from which judgment is now pending decision· 
in this court. A further verdict of the jury was a judg~ 
1nent of $8,000.00 in favor of Fred Sullivan and· against-
Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Company. This ap-
p!eal is fron1 that judgn1ent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 20, 1957, Harvey Stone, an employee of 
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the S & I 1_1rucking Co1npany, was driving a truck and 
trailer of that co1npany loaded with drilling mud. He 
and t\\·o other S & I drivers had loaded their trucks in 
Salt Lake City earlier that day, and were driving east-
ward on U. S. 30s toward Evanston, Wyoming. Late 
that evening, the three S & I Trucks were approaching 
a hill, or incline, about 16.7 miles east of Echo J unct-
ion. At this point the road becomes three-lane with 
t\VO lanes going uphill, or eastward, and one lane down-
hill or \vestward (Ex. H-20 and H-13). 
Approaching this hill Stone attempted to pass the 
lead truck, and while passing in the center lane his 
engine stalled. ( Tr. 75). Stone coasted uphill and as 
far as possible to the right until his truck stopped. 
(Tr. 78). 
The last S & I Truck, driven by Ivan Sheffy, passed 
Stone's truck on the left without crossing the center 
lane and parked 400 or 500 feet farther up the highway 
(Tr. 259, 260). Sheffy parked his truck as far to the 
right as he could, set the brakes, left the headlights on 
lo\v bean1 and the clearance lights on, the turn indicator 
blinking, and proceeded back to Stone's truck to see if 
he could be of help (Tr. 261). 
In the Ineantime, Stone turned off his headlights, 
leaving his clearance lights, taillights and brake lights 
on (Tr. 263, 353). He believed he had run out of gas, 
had S\vitched to the auxiliary tank and was trying to 
start the engine. ( Tr. 76, 265). Immediately there-
after a truck loaded 'vith new pickups and driven by 
Lloyd V. Higginbotha1n, smashed into the rear of the 
S & I Truck. Neither Stone nor Sheffy saw or heard 
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the approach of the Higginbothan1 Truck. 
The truck that ran into the S & I vehicle was owned 
by Fred Sullivan, leased to Western Auto Transport 
Company, and driven by Lloyd V. Higginbotham. At 
the time of the collision, Sullivan was in the sleeper 
compartment of the cab of the tractor. (Tr. 198). 
Both Stone_ and Sheffy testified that the S & I Truck 
-'- . ·-
was entirely :, -1 the outer lane, leaving the center (east 
bound) lane free for vehicles. (Tr. 78, 259, 260). The 
paved roadway at the point of collision is 46 feet in 
width, divided into two eastbound lanes and one west-
boun<i lane. (Ex. H-13). Higginbotham testified that 
he saw nothing until he was 70 feet a"\vay from the 
stalled truck, and further testified that from the appear-
anc;e of the truck at 70 feet he could not tell whether 
the clearance lights were burning or not. (Tr. 93, 100). 
The investigating officer placed the left rear of the 
truck approximately 3 feet over into the center lane 
of traffic. (Tr. 139, Ex. 13). 
This was a dark, clear night, with no precipitation 
at the time of the accident. (Tr. 110). From the west, 
approaching the scene of the accident as Higginbotham 
did, there is 8/10 of a mile unobstructed visibility. (Pre-
Trial Order R-25). There 'vere no oncoming cars or 
obstructions of any kind. (Tr. 92). Higginbotham's 
headlights were burning (Tr. 91). The S & I truck 
weighed about 25 tons loaded 'vith the sacked drilling 
mud (Tr. 303). The rear of the truck was painted 
white, had 5 clearance lights, t\vo large reflectors, and 
a taillight. (Tr. 255, 256). 
Prior to subn1ission of the case to the jury, the 
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trial court ruled as a Inatter of law Higginbotham's 
actions 'vere not ehargeable to Sullivan, the o'vner of 
truek. lT pon the jury's finding that Stone was negli~ 
gent und that such negligence was a proximate cause 
of the collision, the court directed the jury to assess 
da1nage sustained by Sullivan. Upon such assessment, 
the court entered judgment in favor of Sullivan in the 
autount of $8,000.00. This :11dgment i" the one now 
appealed from. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jur~? in accordance with Appellants requested instruct-
ion nu1nber t\vo. 
II. The Court erred in ruling as a Inatter of law 
that Higginbotham's negligence 'vas not chargeable 
to Respondent Fred Sullivan. 
III. The Court erred in the for1n of the questions 
in the special verdict submitted to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN~ 
STRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WIT:g AP-
PELLAKTS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUM-
BER TWO. 
Appellants requested instruction number· two is 
as follows : ( R-65) 
"You are instructed that the driver of the 
Western Auto Transport Truck was negligent as 
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a matter of law, and if you find that he observed 
the stopped S & I Truck upon the highvvay or 
under the circumstances should have observed 
said S & I Truck, but because of his negligence 
failed to do so in time to avoid the accident, then 
you are instructed that the negligence on his 
part was the sole proximate cause of the collis-
ion between the Western Auto Truck and the 
S & I Truck, and your verdict lllust be in favor 
defendants Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking 
Company, and against Florence Schweitzer, Fred 
Sullivan, Lloyd V. Higgenbotham and Western 
Auto Transport Company in their clailns against 
Harvey Stone and S &I Trucking Con1pany, and 
you will further find in favor of Harvey Stone, 
Ivan Sheffy and S & I Trucking Company, and 
against Llloyd V. Higginbotham and Western 
Auto Transport Company, and return verdicts 
therefore in accordance with the instruction on 
damages hereinafter given you." 
Higginbotham testified that he was awake, and 
despite the fact that there were no distractions or on-
coming cars, did not see the parked truck until he was 
·10 fHet away. In this connection, it should be noted 
the physical evidence gave no corroboration to Higgin-
botham's testimony that he saw the truck at 70 feet 
and tried to avoid it. (Tr. 152, 156). 
Under Utah cases, Higginbotham was negligent as 
a Inatter of lavv whether the S & I Truck was unlighted 
(Dalley v. Mid Western Dairy Products Co., 80 Ut. 
331, 15 Pac. 2nd 309) or lighted (Hirshback v. Dubuque 
Packing Co., 7 Ut. 27, 316 Pac. 2nd 319). 
With Higginbotha1n negligence as a Inatter of law, 
the question that n1ust be resolved is whether such 
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neg-I igt\n<'P ,,·a~ the sole proxiinate cause of the accident. 
This ( \> u rt has <~onsidered the saine question under 
si1nilnr fa<'ts in several cases. The two most recent 
<~a~es are Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Ut. 2nd 
14-:1, and ~Ic1Iurdie v. Underwood, 9 Ut. 2nd 400, 346 
Pac. 2nd 711. 
These cases, and the ones before them, draw "a 
clear-cut distinction between two classes of cases." As 
we understand it, the first situation is when one negli-
gent!)' creates a dangerous condition (parking a truck) 
and the later actor observed, or circumstances are such 
that he could not fail to observe, but negligently fails 
to avoid it. 
The second situation is where the later actor negli-
gently becon1es confronted with an emergency situation. 
Under the first situation, as a matter of law, the negli-
gence of the later actor interrupts the sequence of· 
events and cuts off the effect of the negligence of the 
first actor, while in the second situation it is a jury 
question as to "\Vhether the first actors negligence was 
a proximate cause. 
One of the first cases to set out this principle was 
Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line Company, 70 Ut. 552, 
262, P. 100. In this case the driver of the oncoming 
car had 900 feet unobstructed view of the train on the 
road,vay, and failed to avoid it. This Court held that 
as a Inatter of law the negligence of the oncoming 
driver was the sole proximate cause of the collision. 
Under facts quite similar to the instant case, this 
court upheld a finding that the oncoming driver was 
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the sole proximate cause of the collision in Lewis v. 
Savage, 7 U t. 2nd 220, 322 P. 2nd 152. In that case, 
this court said : 
"Where, as in this case, the parking of the truck 
created no danger or hazard to others using the 
highway who use any ordinary caution to 
see and avoid collisions with substantial ob-iects 
•J 
plainly visible on the highvvay in front of thern, 
the court's finding that the negligence of such 
other driver was the sole proxi1nate cause of 
the accident was reasonable and amply sup-
ported by the evidence." 
In the Hillyard case this court upheld a finding 
that the negligence of parking the truck was a contribut-
ing cause of the accident, since under the facts of the case 
(the second driver's view was obstructd by other ve-
hicles) the second driver was negligently confronted 
with an emergency situation. In so holding it was said: 
"It thus seen1s proper to conclude that if the 
evidence was such as to 1nake mandatory a find-
ing that the driver Aston must have seen the 
truck as he approached, but nevertheless ran into 
it, that would have been something so unusual 
and extraordinary as not to be reasonably fore-
seeable. In such instance, his negligence would 
have been an independent intervening cause, in-
sulating defendant's negligence as a proximate 
cause and plaintiff's judgment could not be al-
lowed to stand. If, however, the evidence is 
susceptible of any reasonable interpretation which 
would permit a finding that as Aston approached 
the scene, his view \vas so obstructed by the 
cars he was following and passing that at the 
tilne the third car turned to its left to 1niss the 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
truck the latter loomed up before him as an 
e1nergency situation, then, even though he was 
negligent in getting into such a predicament, a 
jury question would exist as to whether the prior 
negligent parking of the truck was also a con-
curring cause." 
rrhe instruction here refused was patterned directly 
upon the instruction approved in the case of McMurdie 
v. Underwood, Supra. In approving this instruction it 
was held: 
"It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that 
one who approaches a dangerous condition, cre-
ated by the negligence of another, and either 
sees it, or circumstances are such that one must 
see it in time to avoid that danger, and fails to 
do so, becomes the sole proximate cause of any 
da1nage or injury caused thereby." 
"Appellants did not claim nor prove that the 
driver of the pickup truck was confronted with 
an emergency situation so therefore the issue 
rightfully went to the jury whether or not she 
observed the hazard. Absent an emergency situ-
ation, Nancy Dillingham's failure to observe and 
negligently colliding with the appellant became 
the sole proximate cause of the collision. We 
are of the opinion that the complained of instruct-
ion was proper." 
Higginbotha~n had over 4000 feet of unobstructed 
vision of the S & I Truck, yet did not S'ee the vehicle 
until 70 feet avvay. No distractions of any kind inter-
fered with his vision. There was ample room to pass 
the S & I Truck without crossing into the oncoming 
lane of traffic. There was evidence all the clearance 
lights were on. Under these facts, we submit the pro-
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posed instruction was proper. It was clearly the jury's 
province to determine whether, under these facts and 
Utah law, Higginbotham's negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision. 
Appellant was entitled to argue the la'v as set out 
in appellant's requested instruction nu1nber two. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRE~D IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT HIGGINBOTHA~1'S NEGLIGENCE 
WAS NOT CHARGEABLE TO RESPONDENT 
FRED SULLIVAN. 
Fred Sullivan was the owner of the tractor driven 
by Lloyd V. Higginbotham (Pretrial Order). At the 
time of the collision, he was in the sleeper compart-
ment of the cab of the tractor (Tr. 198). Sullivan was 
a "broker" for the two trucks under his arrangement 
with Western Auto. (Tr. 216). He, as owner, had 
leased the truck to Western Auto under that leas~e 
agreement introduced in evidence as Ex. H-25. Ap-
proximately $200.00 per month of the operating expenses 
were paid by respondent, and later reilnbursed by 
Western Auto. (Tr. 212) These expenses were never 
paid by Lloyd V. Higginbotham. (Tr. 211) Although 
respondent testified that Western Auto had the right 
to replace him with another driver, he admitted that 
had never happened during his en1ployment. (Tr. 217) 
The lease provides, among other things, as follows: 
Respondent Sullivan's revenue from the Company 
WaS a percentage ( 65 ro) of the ne.t COlllpany revenues 
fro1n operation of the truck. (R-1, Ex. H-25). 
10 
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All opPrating exp·enses were to be borne by Sulli-
van. ( R-2, Ex. H-25). 
rrhe wages paid to the driver (Higginbotham), al-
though borne by the Co1npany, were in reality paid by 
the ovvner (Sullivan) and withheld from his 65% of 
revenue~. (R-2, Ex. H-25, paragraph IV.) 
.AJl liability for accident, theft, etc., while on com-
pany business, was upon the owner, Sullivan. (R-2, 
ElX. H-25). 
With these facts in mind, let us review the law on 
the question of the responsibility of an owner present 
in the car being driven by another. For Higginbotham 
to he Sullivan's agent, the facts must be such as would 
sustain a jury's finding that Sullivan had the right of 
control over Higginbotham. 
"The ·test of whether one is the agent of the other 
depends upon the right of control of one over 
the other". Fox v. Lavender, 89U. 115, 56 P. 2nd 
1049. 
The fact that Higginbotham was the servant of 
Western Auto does not prevent Sullivan being charge-
able with his negligence as well. Blashfield Cyc. of 
Atttomobile Law & Practice, Vol. 5, Sec. 2920. This 
principle is affir1ned in the annotation at 17 A L R 2nd, 
page 1408, and in the case of Franceschino v. Mack, 102 
.A. 2nd 217. In this case the Pennsylvania Court held: 
"It should pehaps be notedthat two masters 
may have control over one servant so as to 
render both liable . . . Both the lender and the 
borro"\ver may have control over the servant so 
as to render each of then1 liable for his con-
duct ... " 
11 
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Therefore, the fact that Higginbotham was paid by 
Western Auto is only one factor to be considered in 
determining \vhether Higginbotham's negligence was 
chargeable to Sullivan, and is not of itself determinative. 
The fact that the written lease provided Western 
Auto should have exclusive control is likewise a factor 
to be considered, but is not determinative. See Tyler 
v. Jansen, (Wyo.), 295 P. 2nd 742, where the court 
held that judgment in favor of the owner as a matter 
of law was error under a lease with exclusive control 
provisions similar to the one we are considering. Under 
the facts of that case the negligence of the driver was 
imputed to the owner despite the lease, because the 
driver was acting on the owners business. 
When the sole own!er of the vehicle 1s present 
and another is driving, it is presumed that the sole 
owner has the right of control and that the driver is 
driving for him as his agent. Fox v. Lavender, Supra. 
The question of vvhether the driver is acting for the 
owner should be determined from all of the evidence 
and is generally a question of fact for the jury. Anno-
tation, "Owner's presence in motor vehicle operated by 
another as affecting O\vner's rights or liabilities", 147 
ALR 960; 50 ALR 2nd 1281. 
The question here presented is whether a consider-
ation of all the evidence requires a finding that Sullivan 
had no right of control over Higginbothan1. We submit 
that in vie'v of the provisions of the lease previously 
pointed out, Sullivan's pecuniary interest in the trip 
( 65% of the proceeds) and Sullivan's presence in the 
12 
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truck, a question of fact was presented that required 
the findings of a jury. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN THE FORM OF THE 
QUES'riONS IN THE SPE1CIAL VERDICT SUB-
~llr_rTED TO THE JURY. 
It was claimed by respondent that the S & I ve-
hicle driven by Stone had neither lights nor flares 
about it prior to the collision with the Western Auto 
Transport Truck. The evidence was in conflict as to 
lights on the truck, and so this was of course a jury 
question. It was also claimed that Stone was negligent 
by allowing the truck to run out of gas and in failing 
to remove it from the traveled portion of the highway. 
To resolve these questions, the court submitted a special 
verdict. r~Phe first question on the special verdict was : 
(R-90). 
I(A) Was Harvey Stone negligent by allowing the 
gasoline of one tank to become exhausted before switch-
ing to the auxiliary gasoline tank~ 
I(B) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing to 
remove the S & I Truck from the travelled portion of 
the highway? 
I (C) Was I--Iarvey Stone negligent in failing to 
have lights on or flares about the S & I Truck immedi-
ately prior to the collision between the two trucks~ 
The vice apparent in these questions is that the 
matter submitted to the jury is not whether Stone did 
or did not do a certain act, but whether he was negligent 
13 
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in so doing. A very similar verdict \vas considered by 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Johnston v. Eschrich, 
57 N.W. 2nd 396. In that case the clairn was made that 
Eschrich had driven his truck with the tail lights ob-
scured. The trial court submitted this interrogatory to 
the jury: 
"Question One" 
"Was the defendant, Wm. Eschrich, negligent at 
the time and place and under the circu1nstances exist-
ing and just prior to the time of the accident with 
respect to: 
(A) Transporting the load on his truck in such a 
manner so as to obscure the taillight~ 
(B) Not having the said truck equipped with proper 
reflectors." 
In passing on this interrogratory the Supreme 
Court said: 
"At the very best, the question is confusing, 
apparently asking the jury to decide whether it 
was negligence for the defendant to transport a 
load in such a manner as to obscure a taillight, 
a question to which the statute gives an affirn1a-
tive answer. The question should be framed so 
that the jury may say whether the required light 
was present and visible and the question of negli-
gense \vould take care of itself. There is no 
roon1 in the question submitted for the jury to 
answer that the tail light 'vas visible before the 
collision, if they believed that to be the fact, 
although that is an issue to be deter1nined. \Ve 
consider that the question s.ubn1itted is so subject 
14 
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to misinterpretation by the jury that a new trial 
1nust be had in which the respective casual negli-
gences of the parties may be determined by 
answers to questions properly framed." 
WP subn1it that despite the cautionary instructions, 
the for1n of the interrogatories is confusing, and in ef-
fect tells the jury that a particular act was or was not 
done, leaving only for the jury the question of whether 
or not such action was negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the 
Trial Court should be reversed and remanded to the 
Trial Court for a new trial. 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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